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Analyzing the Impact of Foreign Aid on Recipient Transitional Justice 
Implementation 
 
Marc Polizzi  
Murray State University 
 
Jeffrey King 
American University of Sharjah 
Abstract: Some limited scholarship, focused on the US as donor, links the allocation of 
foreign aid to the implementation of transitional justice (TJ) mechanisms in post-
authoritarian recipient states. However, no scholarship systematically examines the link 
between aid from the global donor population and the implementation of TJ mechanisms 
more generally. Further, we know little about how foreign aid influences the types of 
mechanisms that recipients implement because of aid. According to work on the “justice 
cascade,” the international community (ie. donor states) advance criminal accountability 
of former perpetrators in the transitional process, often at the expense of other 
transitional goals. In this piece, we first look at the link between the allocation of aid and 
the likelihood of adoption of TJ mechanisms in post-authoritarian recipient states, 
arguing that donors emphasize the use of aid for criminal accountability in recipient 
states. We then explore the role political risk plays in determining the allocation of aid to 
post-authoritarian recipient states, arguing that in states with higher levels of political 

















Since the end of World War II (WWII), hundreds if not thousands of transitional justice (TJ) 
mechanisms have been adopted in a variety of post-civil conflict and post-authoritarian regimes.1 
With the use of TJ has come questions relating to the financial cost of these mechanisms as well 
as the effect that they have on the stability of the transitioning state.2 The use of trials has been of 
particular interest within this debate. On the one hand, scholars have argued that trials have a 
potential destabilizing effect on the transitioning state in comparison to other mechanisms.3 
Moreover, some scholarship has argued that trials are the most financially costly transitional 
justice mechanisms, with transitioning states being forced to choose between ‘justice’ and 
addressing issues such as the economy instead.4 Given the expensive nature of trials, some have 
argued that states may not ignore transitional justice entirely, but might choose a less expensive 
alternative, such as truth commissions or amnesties instead.5 Given the political realities of the 
transitional state, these alternatives might also mitigate the potential of a backlash effect by 
perpetrators.6 Such a framing of TJ implementation indicates that there is a financial trade-off in 
which some post-authoritarian states may be forced to choose between punishing perpetrators 
and “forgiving and forgetting” based upon the presence/absence of funding for TJ. 
Many of the conclusions of this nature, however, are predicated on the domestic funding of 
TJ, paying less attention to the increasingly prevalent role that the international community has 
in funding and potentially dictating the implementation of TJ in post-authoritarian states. Given 
resource constraints of nascent democracies, many international actors have increasingly funded 
TJ implementation.7 One relatively unexplored source of international funding is that of foreign 
aid. Existing work that does analyze the impact of international aid focus on the U.S.8 or funding 
of specific mechanisms such as UN-led tribunals.9 Foreign aid has been a prevalent financial 
resource for many recipient states since the end of WWII10 and has been used to promote a 
variety of similar purposes as transitional justice.11 Therefore, it is necessary to ask: What effect 




But with the possible use of aid to promote TJ in post-authoritarian states is that donors may 
try to dictate how TJ is implemented (ie. focusing on specific mechanisms). Some evidence also 
points to substantially less funding going to truth commissions as compared to international 
tribunals, which may indicate different reputational benefits for funders.12 For liberal 
democracies, in particular, donor states lead by example by providing resources to international 
war tribunals.13 These reputational benefits are a function of strengthening international human 
rights norms, especially the strengthening of individual criminal accountability in a process 
known as the ‘justice cascade’.14 However, this outcome could mean post-authoritarian states 
potentially prioritize punishment to more victim-oriented objectives. Thus, we ask: Do donors 
pressure states to engage in particular types of transitional justice?     
In this paper, we look at the effect that foreign aid has on the implementation of TJ 
mechanisms in post-authoritarian recipient states. We begin our exploration by first looking at 
the effect of foreign aid on TJ implementation, arguing that more foreign aid increases the 
likelihood of implementation in recipient states. We then argue that donors have preferences for 
specific types of mechanisms, preferring retributive justice mechanisms (i.e., trials) to hold 
individual perpetrators criminally accountable. However, in our initial examination we find 
evidence of donors being ‘risk averse’ when allocating aid to post-authoritarian states. Given 
this, we then argue that the level of political risk within the state greatly determines the allocation 
of aid packages for transitional states. For example, when the international community allocates 
these packages, they act as investors in markets. Investors do not want to provide huge sums of 
money and end up with a “low return.” When applying this logic to international justice 
‘investors,’ donors do not want to provide substantial aid packages to high-risk states that are 
unlikely to develop into stable democracies. Therefore, these investors allocate aid packages with 
an eye to the degree of political instability within the state and the likelihood that these states will 




We organize this paper in the following way. First, we address the literature on transitional 
justice and foreign aid. Second, we outline our causal explanation for why foreign aid allocations 
affect transitional justice processes. Next, we outline the operationalization of our models. 
Finally, we discuss the results of our models, including implications for future research. 
Peace vs. Justice: Maintaining Stability   
 
Transitional justice refers to the collection of ‘processes designed to address past human 
rights violations following periods of political turmoil, state repression, or armed conflict’.15 
While variation exists based on the post-atrocity setting, common objectives include punishing 
perpetrators, repairing the damage done to victims, and constructing institutions conducive to 
long-term peace. Significant debate still exists regarding which mechanisms (or combinations of 
mechanisms) are likely to achieve a stable transitional environment and the prevention of 
democratic backsliding.16 Moreover, the make-up of the institutional environment can serve as a 
substantial roadblock to the formulation of post-authoritarian transitional justice.17  
While not mutually exclusive categories, there are three distinct justice models. First, 
reparative justice aims to provide restitution to victims to mend the damage done during 
autocratic rule, typically via monetary reparations. Second, restorative justice provides victims an 
avenue to express grievances and document abuses, most commonly with truth commissions that 
give previously marginalized peoples a voice in the process. Finally, retributive justice seeks to 
punish perpetrators for individual criminal acts, usually through trials.18  
The transitioning regime’s ability to hold perpetrators accountable varies greatly and is largely 
contingent upon the political dynamics of the transitional system. To better understand this 
variance, Olsen, Payne, and Reiter outline an accountability spectrum that ranges from 
“minimalist” to “maximalist” mechanisms.19 Minimalist accountability corresponds with 
amnesties of individual perpetrators, whereas maximalist approaches are trials for perpetrators. 
States rarely find themselves on either end of the spectrum, instead using some combination of 
mechanisms that reflects political realities. In fact, Olsen, Payne, and Reiter find this holistic 
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approach to be more conducive to achieving stable democratic transitions and positive human 
rights conditions.20 Likewise, international advocates are increasingly supportive of this more 
balanced form of accountability, one that incorporates some form of prosecutions with amnesties 
and truth-seeking.21 While the nature of the atrocity often demands a certain conceptualization of 
justice, practical limitations often determine the make-up of TJ (Nobles 2010). One of the largest 
limitations that transitional states face is the resources available, with states often facing 
limitations in its ability to construct expensive, and potentially destabilizing trials, and other 
pressing economic concerns.22 Given this, the international community, particularly the West, 
has taken a more active role in funding TJ.23  
We argue that the international community is most focused on international security, and as 
such, an emphasis is largely placed on retributive justice as a means of punishing atrocity 
perpetrators and deterring future abuse.24 Conflicts rarely remain contained within national 
borders, and as they spread, they threaten regional stability and spark wider humanitarian 
crises.25 Other scholars contest that implementing trials when perpetrators are still entrenched in 
power incentivizes spoilers to fight back, thereby derailing post-atrocity peace.26 But this does 
not account for the dynamic nature of justice efforts. As Kaufman states, ‘Whether transitional 
justice fosters or hampers international security depends on the particular transitional justice 
option pursued, its location, its scope, and its pace’.27 Despite the pull of other economic 
concerns in the democratization process, growing pressure by international activists means 
ignoring accountability altogether risks signaling the nascent regime’s weak commitment to 
democratic values.28 Indeed, international civil society demands for accountability can 
sometimes be stronger than domestic pressure.29  
Despite skepticism, the individual criminal accountability norm is becoming a prerequisite 
for democratic transitions. While this norm’s origins are largely rooted in the Nuremburg and 
Tokyo Trials following WWII, this accountability model did not take prominence as a global 
norm until the third wave of democratization and the implementation of trials at the domestic 
level in transitional regimes like Greece, Portugal, Argentina, Bolivia, and Guatemala.30 These 
6 
 
incoming leaders made efforts to hold former administrations accountable for human rights 
abuses. While there are multiple sources that have aided in the development of this justice 
cascade, ultimately the international human rights regime—including human rights NGOs, 
individual states, and international organizations—has become increasingly devoted to holding 
perpetrators accountable for human rights atrocities.31 But even with the growth in the use of TJ 
globally, questions remain as to the conditions conducive for the implementation of these 
procedures or the quality of post-authoritarian justice. In the next section, we outline the existing 
literature on mechanisms of transitional justice implementation—both internally (e.g., domestic) 
and externally (e.g., international). As such, donors must assess the trade-offs between short-
term security threats with long-term justice efforts. 
Transitional Justice Implementation  
Under what conditions is a state likely to contend with its history of human rights atrocities? 
Existing literature puts forth several factors to explain the implementation of these structures in 
the post-authoritarian environment. Borrowing from the work of Elster and Kaminski, Nalepa, 
and O’Neill,32 these factors can be divided into two categories: domestic (i.e., administered by 
the transitional society itself) or international (i.e., pursued by those outside of the transitional 
state).33 Existing theories test the effects of the distribution of power in the nascent regime 
between new and old elites,34 the duration of authoritarian rule,35 the pervasiveness of human 
rights atrocities,36 if abuse occurred in “distant memory” or recent past,37 pressure from 
international human rights advocates,38 and the state’s degree of integration into global norms or 
economic trade.39  
Early research focusing solely on domestic sources of transitional justice argued that the 
motivation for justice would be strongest during the transitional phase, with pressure for these 
efforts waning over time.40 Ultimately, the motivation for justice was simply not enough to 
warrant risking the security of the post-authoritarian transition. Instead, TJ implementation was 
highly dependent upon the distribution of power in the new democracy.41 If perpetrators 
maintained significant influence, then the disposition for accountability would be less likely. 
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While a significant predictor of post-authoritarian transitional justice, Nobles (2010) argues this 
analysis largely ignored ‘international factors and the effects of time, democratic processes, and 
emotions’.42  
Furthermore, new regimes can use TJ as a signal to the international community of 
commitment to righting the wrongs of the previous government. Appel and Loyle,43 for instance, 
find that states will implement TJ domestically to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Investors are likely uneasy about investing in a fragmented society that might have weak rule of 
law. As such, transitioning regimes will implement TJ as a costly signal to nervous investors of 
the state’s commitment to rule of law. While the authors empirically test this hypothesis using 
restorative measures of justice (i.e., truth commissions and reparation programs), it stands to 
reason that, with the expansion of the individual criminal accountability norm by the 
international community, investor confidence would also heighten with the implementation of 
tribunals and other retributive mechanisms as well.  
The Role of Foreign Aid 
Another important, yet largely unexplored, external source of funding that explains is the use 
of foreign aid by donor states. The first mass use of foreign aid came under the Marshall Plan 
and was used to promote the economic recovery of post-war Western Europe.44 Since then, 
according to Tierney et al.,45 the official purpose of the vast majority of foreign aid allocated to 
recipient states has been for promotion of economic development in recipient states. As stated by 
Tierney et al. ‘since 1945, wealthier countries have allocated more than $4.9 trillion to 
developing nations for the nominal purpose of lifting the world’s poor out of poverty’46. 
However, one of the more common topics in the foreign aid literature focuses on the elusive link 
between what is termed official development assistance (ODA) and economic growth in recipient 
states, with many scholars concluding that the official purpose of foreign aid may be for 
development but donors largely use aid for other purposes.47 Therefore, aid has largely been an 
instrumental tool of donor states in the pursuit of various strategic objectives, such as the 
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containment of communism during the Cold War.48 Thus, historically, donors have mostly used 
ODA in the pursuit of non-ODA strategic objectives.  
A number of recent studies have also demonstrated that aid can be used by donors to promote 
positive changes in recipient states, such as by supporting the democratization process. Knack 
provided the earliest study linking aid to democratization efforts in recipient states and found that 
global aid efforts did not enhance democracy internationally.49 However, Knack tested a global 
sample of aid allocated to recipient states to democracy levels globally, ignoring that much of the 
aid in his sample was used for purposes other than democratization. Conversely, other scholars 
find that U.S. aid allocated specifically for democracy promotion has a positive and significant 
effect on democratization.50 Democracy aid, as this type of targeted aid is now termed,51 works in 
several ways. According to Savun and Tirone,52 states are at their most vulnerable to civil 
conflict during the democratization process. Democracy aid helps to overcome this time 
inconsistency problem by strengthening institutions and promoting a civil society conducive to 
democracy. Similarly, aid increases the transition to multiparty politics while reducing electoral 
misconduct. Thus, this literature demonstrates that aid can be used to promote democratization 
within recipient states. These findings are important for our exploration of the factors explaining 
TJ implementation because one of the primary purposes of TJ is to strengthen democratic 
processes in post-transition states.53 
Meanwhile, the literature linking foreign aid and human rights conditions in recipient states is 
limited at best. Much of this literature has focused on the effect of aid lending from powerful 
international organizations such as the IMF and World Bank, with the focus being on the 
structural-adjustment conditions placed on recipient states rather than on aid directly.54 Further, 
early studies looking at aid and human rights conditions suggest that donors rewarded states with 
poor human rights records during the Cold War period, calling into question the use of aid to 
improve conditions in recipient states.55 Other scholars argue that aid, by itself, is an ineffective 
means of influencing government policy towards human rights conditions in recipient states.56 
Since then, the literature linking human rights and foreign aid has been sporadic at best. 
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Nielsen,57 for example, looks at whether donors punish repressive recipient governments by 
reducing aid flows and finds that donors are hesitant to reduce aid to politically proximate 
governments. Literature of the type above highlight that foreign aid may not play a significant 
role in the improvement of human rights in recipient states. However, Richards et al.58 find that 
foreign economic penetration, of which foreign aid is a type, can and does influence the adoption 
of policies within recipient states. Thus, this suggests that foreign aid could play a role by 
inducing recipient states to adopt TJ mechanisms. 
Given that donors have used foreign aid to promote objectives like democratization, the 
improvement of human rights, or even just the pursuit of strategic objectives, it should come as 
no surprise that donors might use foreign aid to promote TJ mechanism implementation. With 
that being said, the literature linking foreign aid to transitional justice is quite limited, and 
focuses on why donors choose to allocate foreign aid in support TJ. According to Arthur,59 for 
example, donors—especially bilateral donors—use aid instrumentally in pursuit of further goals 
beyond TJ. Donors allocate aid, for example, in pursuit of further democratization, development, 
or as a means of promoting stability within a state, but TJ is not the end goal when aid is being 
allocated to promote it. Further, strategic objectives remain paramount in donor calculations, and 
donors do not allocate aid for TJ that contradicts strategic interests. Arthur argues in her 
conclusion that we should expect donors to pursue TJ using aid,60 but only when it furthers their 
strategic interests. Conversely, Arthur argues that donors cannot be expected to use aid in pursuit 
of TJ when aid might increase the risk of instability within the recipient state, which would 
threaten the donor’s strategic objective. Thus, the use of aid for TJ is not that dissimilar to 
donors’ calculations when allocating aid more generically, but donors seem to consider risk as a 
further factor when pursuing TJ implementation. 
States as Investors 
 As the transitional justice literature outlined above demonstrates, the culture of impunity at 
the international level has largely been replaced by individual criminal accountability. However, 
most TJ states are middle- and lower-income, meaning domestic funding for these mechanisms is 
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nearly impossible with competing needs for rebuilding the state (Arthur 2018).61 As such, TJ 
states often turn to the international community for financial assistance of these procedures, and 
we predict that these states will pursue justice that is consistent with international norms.62 
Specifically, we expect states to implement trials as the main avenue of accountability.  
Even if the new regime indicates its willingness to pursue prosecutions, this does not 
necessarily mean these new actors desire a complete end to the culture of impunity. These new 
actors are largely untested democratic actors. As there are an abundance of cases of democratic 
backsliding, new regimes can succumb to the same sins as their predecessors and use repressive 
tactics to coerce dissenters or as an instrument to punish former regime actors. The recent case of 
human rights abuses against the Rohingya in Myanmar serves as an unsettling example. As such, 
donors face an adverse selection problem, similar to the effect observed in humanitarian 
interventions.63  
Expanding upon work that explored humanitarian interventions as a moral hazard,64 
Rauchhaus describes an adverse selection issue resulting from asymmetric information between 
a potential intervener and the parties in the conflict.65 The intervening state does not know the 
true preferences of these actors and therefore must use information short cuts to make sure 
domestic actors uphold the contract. Turning to TJ, because nascent democratic regimes are 
untested, potential donors do not know that the state will uphold its commitment to 
accountability, rule of law, or democratic institutions—which are objectives that the international 
community prioritizes.66 Therefore, donors must turn to alternative means of information—a 
shortcut to having perfect information about the recipient. The recipient’s level of political risk 
serves as this shortcut.  
 Recent work by Arthur indicates a high degree of variability by foreign governments for 
transitional justice.67 This problem is amplified when looking at multilateral TJ projects that 
include networks of states, international organizations, and non-governmental advocates. Even 
within states that prioritize TJ as a focus of their foreign policy, these countries often lack any 
formal institutionalization of these procedures. Instead, ‘TJ continues to fit into existing 
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institutional structures in a highly variable way, and it generally lacks policies or even dedicated 
focal points to guide decision-making and coordination’68. Additionally, states spend social 
capital in addition to monetary and technical costs and would want to spend resources in 
locations that will produce the greatest expansion of their soft power.69 Japan, for instance, was a 
primary contributor to transitional justice in Cambodia, while not providing similar funds 
anywhere else in the world. Japan’s assistance to justice in Cambodia was ‘partly motivated by 
its wish to project its power regionally’70. Other research on international tribunals also points to 
a regional bias.71 Therefore, we argue that the expected return on these investments matters to 
donor states and that donors will not invest in overly risky recipient environments as a result.   
 To summarize, we theorize the relationship between transitional justice and foreign aid based 
on two interrelated incentive structures. First, new leaders in recipient states desire foreign aid in 
order to help rebuild the state and its institutions. Democratizing states signal their commitment 
to accountability by pursuing trials to attract foreign aid from international donors, similar to the 
findings of Appel and Loyle on TJ and foreign direct investment, whereby they argue that 
leaders of post-conflict states use TJ mechanisms as a signal to multinational corporations that 
the domestic environment is stable and conducive for business.72 Second, the domestic incentive 
for post-authoritarian states to pursue accountability is consistent with the goals of the 
international community, specifically the normative objective of the justice cascade and 
individual criminal accountability. Donors work to minimize case-specific information needed to 
fund the rebuilding of post-authoritarian states. Therefore, donors will look to the recipient’s 
level of political risk in order to determine the best environments in which to invest. Because of 
these mutually beneficial incentive structures, we predict that the attraction of this aid by post-
authoritarian governments ensures the enactment of transitional justice—specifically individual 
criminal accountability mechanisms in the form of human rights trials.  
Hypotheses 
We have divided our hypotheses into two sections. The first is focused on the effect of the 
provision of foreign aid on the implementation of TJ mechanisms. Here we look at whether the 
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allocation of foreign aid increases the likelihood of recipients implementing TJ mechanisms and 
argue that when recipient states receive more foreign aid, they are more likely to implement 
transitional justice mechanisms. In this instance, aid acts as an added resource for the recipient to 
use to recover from the transition from authoritarianism.73 Recipients use aid to fund TJ efforts in 
this manner. Thus, as foreign aid increases, this should also increase the number of TJ 
implemented. Therefore, our first hypothesis is simply: 
H1: Post-authoritarian states that receive a higher degree of foreign aid are more likely 
to implement transitional justice mechanisms than states that receive less aid. 
Moreover, the international community influences the type of transitional justice mechanisms 
that these states employ. Using the literature emphasizing the expansion of international norms,74 
we argue that the international community has traditionally encouraged individual criminal 
accountability for perpetrators over a culture of impunity, specifically through trials. Thus, states 
receiving more aid should be under increased pressure to implement transitional justice 
mechanisms in the form of human rights trials75. From this argument we provide our second 
hypothesis: 
H2: Post-authoritarian states that receive a higher degree of foreign aid are more likely to 
implement human rights trials than states that receive less aid. 
The second part of our analysis focuses on whether the political stability of the recipient state 
influences the amounts of aid received and the likelihood of TJ mechanisms being implemented. 
We argue that less-stable states (ie. high risk) are seen as riskier investments by donors and as a 
result, these states should be less likely to receive aid for the purpose of TJ mechanism 
implementation. This is due to donors viewing aid for TJ as an investment. They give more aid 
when transitional justice mechanisms further certain strategic objectives, but less aid when these 
mechanisms might risk those same strategic objectives. In effect, in less stable states these 
mechanisms are seen as a risk to the strategic objectives of donors—regardless of whether these 
objectives are democratization, state stability, or so forth—and aid is seen as a “bad investment”. 
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Due to this, these states should be less likely to receive both aid for the purpose of TJ mechanism 
implementation and less aid at the aggregate level also. Thus, our third hypothesis is:  
H3: Post-authoritarian states that are considered politically unstable are less likely to 
receive foreign aid than states that are considered more politically stable. 
Research Design  
In this paper, we are primarily concerned with the transitional justice mechanisms that are 
implemented in post-authoritarian recipient states. Given that, our sample is comprised of the 
global population of post-authoritarian states that were allocated foreign aid. Within our sample 
are different types of authoritarian regimes such as dictatorships, military juntas, or one-party 
rule that went through a transition to democracy. Our unit of analysis is the post-authoritarian 
recipient-year for the period of 1990 to 2002 for 129 recipient states. 
To create our sample, we utilize the standard of the Authoritarian Regime and Transition 
Type Dataset (ARTT) developed by Andrew Reiter in conjunction with the Transitional Justice 
Data Base Project.76 The goal of ARTT is to ‘test whether the type of authoritarian regime, the 
length of that regime, or the type of transition to democracy affect specific components of the 
democratization process or decisions of new democratic leaders’77. This purpose is directly 
related to what we are addressing within this paper. We are concerned with the actions of newly 
democratizing states and the incentives that their leaders have in pursuing transitional justice. 
These incentives are heavily influenced by the nature of the regime, the bargaining position of 
previous abusers, and the nature of the transition itself. As Huntington argues, new democratic 
leaders will have a more difficult time prosecuting former perpetrators if these same democratic 
leaders are still affiliated with the government.78 
For our dependent variables, we utilize different specifications of TJ implementation. Our 
measures of TJ mechanisms come from the Transitional Justice Database Project from Payne, 
Olsen, and Reiter.79 This dataset compiles information on five major TJ mechanisms: truth 
commissions, human rights trials, lustration policy, reparations, and amnesties. From this source, 
we created three separate dependent variables to test our three hypotheses, trying to determine if 
14 
 
foreign aid has an effect on the implementation of transitional justice in post-authoritarian states. 
To test our first hypothesis, we simply want to see if states are more likely to engage in any 
measure of transitional justice. Therefore, we include a count of all five types of transitional 
justice at the country-year level as our first dependent variable. Second, to test Hypothesis 2, we 
are concerned with the number of human rights trials that are implemented at the country-year 
level as a result of foreign aid. As such, we employ a count of trials implemented in a given 
country-year as our second dependent variable. This approach determines how many individual 
criminal accountability mechanisms are implemented within the state.80 Finally, to test 
hypothesis three, we created a binary variable measured as 1 if a TJ mechanism was 
implemented in a given year or 0 if not. Utilizing this binary measure allows us to interact our 
transitional justice mechanism variables with measure of risk for hypothesis 3 and provides us 
with some substantive effects.   
For our independent variable, we focus on the total amount of foreign aid allocated to 
individual post-authoritarian recipient states. We use the dataset AidData 2.1 for our foreign aid 
data. AidData 2.181 is the most comprehensive aid dataset available today, with the sample 
including 289,566 entries for all donor-recipient dyads for the period of 1947 to 2012.82 In 
AidData 2.1, two country-year variables are available, that of commitments and disbursements. 
We use commitments of aid instead of disbursements of aid in this study because the coverage of 
the commitments variable is significantly greater than disbursements, with disbursements only 
covering the post-2002 period83, limiting its overlap with the ARTT database. We also must 
acknowledge that a dataset including aid used specifically to support transitional justice would be 
most appropriate here, but unfortunately do not have access to data of that type to date. We use a 
human rights aid84 variable in our robustness checks to address this lack of TJ aid, but this data 
also does not fit well with the ARTT database. Thus, we ultimately use the natural logarithm of 
the total amount of commitments of aid recipients receive by year in US millions of dollars as 
our foreign aid variable. 
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We control for a variety of factors based on the conditions of the previous authoritarian 
regime, the nature of the transition, the length that the government was under authoritarian 
leadership, as well as numerous characteristics of the state’s political and economic performance. 
These factors help avoid spuriousness in our relationship. Previous research indicates a variety of 
factors regarding the elements of the previous regime—and how well ingrained they are in the 
newly democratized state—will determine the ability of new leaders to pursue transitional 
justice, or even the type of justice implemented (Huntington 1991; Nobles 2010; Olsen, Payne, 
and Reiter 2010a). When there is not a clear break between the previous regime and the new 
regime, it becomes more difficult for former leaders to prosecute perpetrators for fear of 
destabilizing the transitional process.85 Prosecutorial sovereignty is greater in cases when there is 
a clear break from the previous regime and in cases where the balance of power is favorable to 
the new regime.86 Other efforts are largely compromises between domestic and international 
pressure for accountability on the one hand and the protection of perpetrators against prosecution 
on the other hand. Such efforts relate to reconciliation and is the main reason for the creation of 
truth commissions. 
For the conditions of authoritarianism, we utilize the ARTT dataset. First, these data 
determine the type of autocracy based on characteristics, such as individualism or 
institutionalism and civilian or military regime. Regime length simply determines ‘the length of 
time, in years, that the authoritarian regime that immediately precedes the transition to 
democracy held power’87. Transition type includes factors such as if the regime was overthrown 
(either from domestic or international forces), if the regime collapsed completely, and if the 
regime came from a negotiated settlement (led either by the regime or the opposition). This 
variable also determines if democracy emerged from civil war or if the democratic regime 
emerged upon independence. 
Finally, we include a number of control variables relevant to both aid efforts and transitional 
justice efforts in recipient states. We include the regime-type of the recipient state, with the 
assumption that more democratic states have better human rights conditions.88 Further, many 
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donors have historically allocated more aid to former colonial territories, making it necessary to 
control for colonial histories.89 Related to this, the legal traditions of metropoles often manifest in 
similar legal traditions in the former colonies.90 In turn, the legal traditions within the recipient 
state potentially act as predictors of whether transitional justice mechanisms are adopted and in 
what form they take, making it necessary to control for legal traditions.91 These measures are 
also utilized to address potential omitted variable bias. Given that our sample is recipient aid 
totals by year, we cannot directly factor in the strategic interests donor states might have in 
recipient states. Instead, we can only address this indirectly by including such measures of 
former colonial ties and other related proxies.92 Finally, both the wealth of the state and 
population of the state have been linked to human rights conditions.93 
To carry out the analysis, we included a number of models and approaches to estimate the 
effect of foreign aid on the implementation of TJ mechanisms in post-authoritarian recipient 
states. In the first part of our analysis, results included in Table 1, we provide two models using 
our two TJ count variables (Full Count, Trials respectively) as dependent variables to test 
Hypotheses 1-2 in Models 1-2. We utilize negative binomial regression models with each right-
side variable lagged by one year. In the second part of the analysis, in Table 2, we are interested 
in the effect of political risk on aid totals and TJ mechanisms. We provide a measure of political 
risk taken from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) on the right side of Models 1 and 2 
that is interacted with our aid variable in each model. To provide substantive effects of the 
interactive effect of foreign aid and political risk on implementation, we utilize the binary 
measure of TJ implementation in Model 1 of Table 2 along with the total count of TJ 
implementation in Model 2. Each model included in the analysis is also fitted with robust 
standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity.94  
Findings 
For the first part of our analysis, we analyze how international aid commitments influenced 
the number of TJ mechanisms implemented within a state. Table 1 demonstrates these findings 
below. As is shown in Model 1, states that received higher levels of aid commitments 
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implemented more transitional justice mechanisms, providing support for Hypothesis 1. Further, 
we looked at whether commitments also influence the type of transitional justice. Model 2 shows 
that aid commitments are associated with the number of human rights trials implemented within 
the state. Therefore, we can argue that states that receive more international commitments are 
more likely to pursue accountability mechanisms, providing support for Hypothesis 2. Looking at 
our results, a number of control variables are significant as well. The human rights score of 
recipient states in both models is negative and highly significant, suggesting that recipients with 
better human rights are less likely to implement transitional justice mechanisms. In contrast to 
that, legal origins, whether English or socialist/communist, seems to increase the likelihood of 
transitional justice implementation. Meanwhile, regime type does not have a significant effect on 
overall count or trials. In contrast, states are less likely to implement trials after transitioning 
from a civil war. This finding, in particular, may provide some support for our theory of risk in 
Hypothesis 3, because trials in this instance might be quite ‘risky’ and destabilize the state. 
 
Table 1: Negative Binomial Regression, The Effect of Total Aid Commitments on Transitional 
Justice Implementation in Post-Authoritarian States 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES TJ(t+1) Trials(t+1) 
Commitments (ln) 0.11508** 0.20226** 
 (0.054) (0.101) 
Fariss Human Rights -0.46145*** -0.61013** 
 (0.129) (0.256) 
Polity 2 -0.01931 -0.01663 
 (0.015) (0.034) 
Population (ln) -0.10045 -0.34629* 
 (0.090) (0.191) 
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GDP per capita (constant) (ln) -0.15236* -0.05991 
 (0.090) (0.185) 
International Conflict 0.31787 -0.18628 
 (0.350) (0.754) 
Civil Conflict -0.13060 -0.34796 
 (0.324) (0.761) 
HRO Count 0.05234 0.43549 
 (0.150) (0.290) 
English Legal Origin 1.30546** 33.90108*** 
 (0.538) (1.560) 
SocComm Legal Origin 1.37031*** 18.10257*** 
 (0.459) (2.059) 
Age of Democracy -0.00427* 0.00297 
 (0.003) (0.005) 
Civil War Transition -0.25228 -16.76927*** 
 (0.682) (0.833) 
Collapse -0.02930 -0.43135 
 (1.287) (1.194) 
Overthrow 0.89015 1.71136 
 (0.889) (1.101) 
Sudden Transition 0.46783 2.13052** 
 (0.819) (0.959) 
Constant -0.88969 -20.25130*** 
 (1.546) (3.246) 
Observations 1,595 1,595 
 
In the first part of our analysis, we looked at whether foreign aid increases the likelihood of 
the implementation of TJ mechanisms. In the second part of our analysis, we instead look at 
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whether donors give aid in general to states that implement TJ mechanisms, building up to 
testing hypothesis 3. Looking at Figure 1 below, for example, we can clearly see that states that 
implemented TJ mechanisms of any kind actually received substantially less aid in comparison to 
those that did not implement TJ mechanisms. In Figure 1, the global aid totals (in $U.S. millions) 
are split into two categories. The first category is the sum total of all aid received by non-
transitional justice recipients. The second category is the sum total of all transitional justice 
recipients. Looking at the figure, recipients without any TJ mechanisms in a given year received 
an average of approximately $86 billion per year of commitments of aid. In contrast, the TJ 
recipients received only $22.5 billion per year in commitments of aid.  This result may seem 
surprising, suggesting that donors are not giving aid to recipients for TJ purposes. However, this 
is a separate test from our first analysis, as now we are looking at factors that explain why donors 
might give aid (or in this case not give) aid to recipient states. What these findings show is that 
donors do not seem to give aid to states that have implemented TJ mechanisms, suggesting that 
there is some other unexplored but relevant factor at play that explains aid flows to recipient 
states. 
Figure 1: A Comparison of Aid Commitments for Transitional Justice Recipients versus Non-





Transitional justice recipients also vary by the number of TJ mechanisms implemented in 
recipient states as well. Looking at Figure 2, we can see that more TJ mechanisms implemented 
by recipients decreases aid efforts to those states. In the figure, we disaggregate aid totals to the 
total count of TJ mechanisms implemented per year by the recipient. Looking at the figure, we can 
see that states that implemented one TJ mechanism received the most commitments of aid over 
time. In contrast, states that implemented three or four TJ mechanisms received the least amounts 
of commitments of aid. Thus, there appears to be some hidden factor present that is explaining 
disparities in aid totals between TJ recipients and non-TJ recipients and with the number of TJ 
mechanisms implemented. 
Figure 2: A Comparison of Aid Commitments for Transitional Justice Recipients Disaggregated 




What explains the disparities highlighted in Figures 1 and 2? One reason why these 
disparities exist, we theorize, is due to the risk calculations of donor states. This sample is of 
post-authoritarian states. For donor states, allocating aid to these states is considered a risk from 
the beginning, because any aid given could easily be misappropriated and misused by the 
recipient government. Thus, when donors consider a potential recipient state to be unstable and 
“risky” for the donor, they are hesitant to give aid period. Coupled with this, transitional justice 
mechanisms are often considered particularly risky for these sometimes highly unstable states. 
Research by Huntington and Vinjamuri and Snyder displayed fear of a rise in post-authoritarian 
violence as perpetrators would lash out in violence when faced with prosecution.95 This violence 
could destabilize the transitional process, risking a return to civil conflict or backslide into 
authoritarianism. As a result, recipients deemed high risk are unlikely to receive large amounts of 
aid from donors.  
 To test this assertion, a risk variable was added to the base model specifications in Table 1 
using both a binary dependent variable (Model 3) and a count dependent variable (Model 4) that 
was then interacted with commitments of aid to test if there was any interactive effect between aid 
and risk. Looking at the results, we can see that this appears to be the case. Looking at Model 3 
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and Model 4 in Table 2, both constitutive terms of the interactive effect are significant at 0.05. 
Commitments has a negative and significant effect in the absence of risk, suggesting that the more 
aid committed to the recipient state, the less likely a TJ mechanism will be implemented. Further, 
when the risk score of the recipient state increases, signifying less risk because high scores signify 
more stable states, this also decreased the probability of a TJ mechanism being implemented. 
However, when those two terms are interacted with each other, we can see that when commitments 
increase and risk decreases, the probability of a TJ mechanism also increases. In fact, when the 
risk score of the state moves from the highest risk (20) to lowest (91), foreign aid shifts from 
negative and insignificant to positive and significant at .05, strongly supporting hypothesis 3. 
Ultimately, this suggests perceptions of risk, must be accounted for before we can expect that aid 
will increase the likelihood of TJ mechanisms being implemented. 
Table 2: The Effect of Total Aid Commitments and Political Risk on Transitional Justice 
Implementation in Post-Authoritarian States 
 (3) (4) 
VARIABLES TJ(t+1) Count of TJ(t+1) 
Commitments (ln) -0.85081** -0.78663*** 
 (0.383) (0.267) 
Political Risk -0.29515*** -0.27852*** 
 (0.111) (0.077) 
Commitments*Risk 0.01409** 0.01312*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) 
Fariss Human Rights -0.28926 -0.15903 
 (0.262) (0.244) 
Polity 2 0.00319 -0.00252 
 (0.031) (0.030) 
Population (ln) 0.04580 0.05209 
 (0.149) (0.132) 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.14341 -0.17694 
 (0.144) (0.131) 
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Interstate Conflict 1.7443* 0.73582** 
 (0.629) (0.351) 
Intrastate Conflict -1.04008 -0.57817 
 (0.640) (0.352) 
HRO Count (ln) 0.23144 0.30113 
 (0.406) (0.335) 
English Legal Origin 0.51251 0.35843 
 (1.020) (0.925) 
French Legal Origin -0.01925 -0.05121 
 (1.072) (0.961) 
SocComm Legal Origin 0.86151 0.78119 
 (1.156) (1.036) 
German Legal Origin  -17.82590*** 
(1.137) 
Scand Legal Origin  -18.93362*** 
(1.495) 
Age of Democracy -0.00568 -0.00363 
 (0.005) (0.004) 
Civil War  -20.68480*** 
(0.674) 
Collapse 1.16958 0.56892 
 (1.772) (1.046) 
Overthrow 1.60256 0.97079 
 (1.466) (0.782) 
Constant 15.36790** 14.00753*** 
 (7.453) (5.227) 
Observations 848 860 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, p<0.1 
 
We can see this pattern play out using Figures 3 below. Looking at the figure, we can see that 
commitments of aid crosses the x-axis, suggesting both a positive and negative effect on TJ 
implementation when interacted with risk, albeit at varying degrees of significance. When the 
political environment of the recipient is considered to be high risk (lower scores denote more 
risk), commitments of aid have a negative but insignificant relationship with TJ implementation. 
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However, when the political environment of the recipient is considered low risk, commitments of 
aid increase the probability of transitional justice being implemented at a highly significant level. 
In fact, we can see the probability shift from -.1 (insignificant) for the riskiest states to .033 
(significant at .1) for the most stable states. Thus, it appears as if donors weigh risk as an 
important part of the story in explaining how aid efforts affect TJ efforts in recipient states. 
 
 
A similar pattern emerged when using the count of transitional justice mechanisms also. 
Looking at Model 4 in Table 2, we can see that commitments of aid and political risk again have 
a negative effect on the count of total TJ mechanisms implemented by the recipient state. In 
contrast, however, the interactive effect is again significant and positive. In this case, as 
commitments increase and risk decreases, the probability of the count of TJ mechanisms also 
increases. Similar to Figure 3, we see a substantial shift in Figure 4. The effect of aid, when 
interacted with risk, goes from negative and insignificant for the highest risk states to a positive 
and significant effect for the least risky states, representing a shift in probability from -.122 
(insignificant) to .022 (significant at .05). Thus, again, it seems that risk is a factor in explaining 
the amounts of aid as well as whether or not aid is effective in encouraging the implementation 






This paper argues that the international community’s use of foreign aid has important 
implications for the implementation of transitional justice in post-authoritarian states. Building 
on the work of Kim,96 Bird,97 and Olsen, Payne, and Reiter,98 we argue that the foreign aid 
donors plays an important role in TJ implementation. We first argue that states that receive 
greater amounts of foreign aid are more likely to implement transitional justice, specifically 
accountability mechanisms. Our findings confirmed our expectations and suggest that donor 
states prioritize justice when supporting the implementation of TJ efforts in recipient states. 
Further, our initial analysis suggested that the international community acts as investors, 
determining where to allocate funds based on an analysis of risk in the recipient state. Given this, 
we employ a measure of risk to test if donors are making calculations based upon perceived risks 
in TJ states, with our expectations largely confirmed as a result. 
The findings contained in this paper have several implications for the broader literature. 
Perhaps most concerning is that our findings suggest that donors avoid the worst violators of 
human rights when allocating aid to promote TJ implementation in post-authoritarian states. If, 
as we find, donors allocate aid to low-risk post-authoritarian states, then our findings suggest that 
they are investing in only the most stable (ie. less risky) recipients. These states, although they 
may benefit from outside support for implementation of TJ, are of a type that would need the 
least support from donors because violations of human rights are likely to be fewer in quantity 
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and less severe in nature. In contrast, in less stable states violations of human rights are more 
likely to be frequent and severe in nature. These states are most likely still grappling with the 
legacy of the pre-transition period. In effect, this means that donors may be selecting the “easy” 
cases to encourage the use of transitional justice mechanisms. But this is a troubling conclusion, 
because it suggests that milder human rights violators may be held to more stringent standards 
than major violators in riskier states.   
On the other hand, there is evidence to suggest that donors are not the ones doing the 
selection in the case of transitional justice. Instead, it is plausible that recipients are actually 
selecting donors by implementing transitional justice mechanisms. Appel and Loyle argue that 
states use transitional justice mechanisms to signal to international investors and multinational 
corporations that the state is now ‘open for business’.99 Recipient states may do something 
similar to signal to donors that they are suitable for foreign aid allocations. If this is the case, then 
the relationship is actually reversed, suggesting that there may be a problem with endogeneity in 
our study100. We have provided robustness checks to allay some concerns over this, but further 
testing is needed to test how recipients attract donor states.  
Finally, it is important to consider the relationship between aid and TJ implementation in 
post-conflict states also. Transitional justice was developed to address conditions in both post-
authoritarian and post-conflict states, aiming to address a broad array of human rights violations. 
Given this, we would expect our findings to hold for post-conflict states, but there are important 
differences to consider also. Civil wars tend to last a long time, especially when they are fought 
using irregular means of warfare.101 Furthermore, when there are multiple factions in the conflict, 
this can make negotiated settlements more difficult to initiate and to ensure compliance. As our 
findings demonstrate, donors are concerned, at least in part, on how stable the environment is for 
their investment, which then leads to transitional justice accountability. However, if a post-
conflict state is fragmented or unstable, donors might view that state as high risk and avoid 
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Table 1: Negative Binomial Regression, The Effect of Total Aid Disbursements on Transitional 




Disbursements (ln) -0.00979 
 (0.036) 
Fariss Human Rights -0.40711*** 
 (0.139) 
Polity 2 -0.02318 
 (0.016) 
Population (ln) -0.05249 
 (0.089) 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.13222 
 (0.096) 
International Conflict 0.13743 
 (0.314) 
Civil Conflict 0.08581 
 (0.291) 
HRO Count 0.05547 
 (0.166) 
English Origin 1.40151** 
 (0.570) 
French Origin 0.88023 
 (0.547) 
SocComm Legal Origin 1.28037*** 
 (0.492) 
Age of Democracy -0.00790*** 
 (0.003) 













Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 2: Logistic Regression, The Effect of Total Aid Disbursements and Political Risk on 
Transitional Justice Implementation in Post-Authoritarian States 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Binary TJt+1 
  
Disbursements (ln) 0.09051 
 (0.255) 




Fariss Human Rights -0.34499 
 (0.272) 
Polity 2 -0.00111 
 (0.031) 
Population (ln) -0.01560 
 (0.160) 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.19638 
 (0.148) 
Interstate Conflict 1.05788 
 (0.659) 
Civil Conflict -1.01400 
 (0.666) 
HRO Count (ln) 0.44286 
 (0.418) 
English Origin 0.71257 
 (1.008) 
French Origin 0.31537 
 (1.074) 
SocComm Origin 1.23841 
 (1.218) 











Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 3: Negative Binomial Regression, The Effect of Human Rights Aid Commitments on 
Transitional Justice Implementation in Post-Authoritarian States 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES TJt+1 Trialt+1 
   
HR Commitments (ln) 0.06954 0.41654*** 
 (0.059) (0.143) 
Fariss Human Rights -0.42508** -1.17092** 
 (0.211) (0.562) 
Polity 2 -0.02609 0.08906 
 (0.025) (0.057) 
Population (ln) -0.16436 -0.87566* 
 (0.169) (0.519) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.11366 0.58386 
 (0.200) (0.411) 
International Conflict 0.31807 -17.30755*** 
 (0.551) (1.226) 
Civil Conflict -0.27201 15.58987*** 
 (0.457) (0.950) 
HRO Count  0.33951 -1.38156 
 (0.421) (1.382) 
English Origin 14.28514*** 18.21722*** 
 (0.739) (4.615) 
French Origin 14.80159*** 1.65994 
 (0.831) (4.212) 
SocComm Origin 15.17623*** -11.60208 
 (1.067) (.) 
Age of Democracy -0.00202 0.01890 
 (0.004) (0.012) 
Civil War Transition -14.33807*** -21.78038*** 
 (1.067) (1.334) 
Collapse 0.38692 1.11287 
 (0.668) (0.874) 
Overthrow -13.79220*** -2.59970* 
36 
 
 (1.115) (1.427) 
Constant -31.33250*** -40.19481*** 
 (2.422) (3.394) 
Observations 450 450 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Table 4: The Effect of Total Aid Commitments and Political Risk on Transitional Justice 
Implementation in Post-Authoritarian States 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Binary TJt+1 Count of TJt+1 
   
HR Commitments (ln) -0.16672 -0.21470 
 (0.371) (0.259) 
Political Risk -0.08618 -0.08843 
 (0.090) (0.066) 
Commitments*Risk 0.00365 0.00434 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
Fariss Human Rights -0.28415 -0.32731 
 (0.388) (0.326) 
Polity 2 0.03186 0.03214 
 (0.044) (0.039) 
Population (ln) -0.17825 -0.26605 
 (0.235) (0.219) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.20303 0.01400 
 (0.209) (0.189) 
Interstate Conflict 1.58839 0.45505 
 (1.396) (0.660) 
Civil Conflict -1.69649 -0.76862 
 (1.352) (0.611) 
HRO Count (ln) 0.49690 0.95287 
 (0.666) (0.581) 
English Origin 14.90020*** 14.07173*** 
 (0.518) (0.954) 
French Origin 15.27010*** 14.81416*** 
 (1.058) (1.180) 
SocComm Origin 16.30758*** 15.87758*** 
 (1.357) (1.421) 
Age of Democracy -0.00352 0.00076 
 (0.007) (0.006) 
Collapse 0.65282 0.17700 
 (1.324) (0.796) 
37 
 
Civil War Transition  -15.01421*** 
  (1.092) 
Overthrow  -14.21415*** 
  (1.148) 
Constant -14.36216*** -27.23598*** 
 (5.376) (4.276) 
Observations 373 382 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Testing for Endogeneity: 
Table 5: The Effect of Counts of Transitional Justice Mechanisms on Foreign Aid Commitment 
Totals in Post-Authoritarian States 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Commitments (ln)t+1 Commitments (ln)t+1 
   
Transitional Justice (count) 0.04256  
 (0.036)  
Amnesty   
   
Trials  -0.03999 
  (0.087) 
Fariss Human Rights 0.02319 0.01506 
 (0.104) (0.105) 
Polity 2 0.00993 0.01030 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
Population (ln) 0.69175*** 0.69044*** 
 (0.139) (0.139) 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.36555* -0.37271* 
 (0.219) (0.219) 
International Conflict -0.18335 -0.19673 
 (0.252) (0.253) 
Civil Conflict 0.15299 0.16570 
 (0.249) (0.250) 
HRO Count (ln) 0.38622* 0.38477* 
 (0.213) (0.213) 
English Origin -0.20294 -0.17816 
 (0.797) (0.803) 
French Origin 0.10750 0.12834 
 (0.932) (0.937) 
SocComm Origin -0.37054 -0.35171 
 (0.698) (0.700) 
Age of Democracy 0.00105 0.00100 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Civil War Transition 0.20163 0.21162 
 (0.207) (0.220) 
38 
 
Collapse -1.36319 -1.35751 
 (1.282) (1.291) 
Overthrow -1.60719* -1.56160 
 (0.967) (0.966) 
Sudden Transition 1.57209* 1.58844* 
 (0.910) (0.907) 
Constant 12.83205*** 12.91162*** 
 (3.179) (3.179) 
Observations 1,606 1,606 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 6: The Effect of Counts of Transitional Justice Mechanisms on Foreign Aid Disbursement 
Totals in Post-Authoritarian States 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Disbursements (ln)t+1 Disbursements (ln)t+1 
   
Transitional Justice (count) 0.15707**  
 (0.063)  
Amnesty   
   
Trials  0.09667 
  (0.080) 
Fariss Human Rights 0.57530*** 0.55557*** 
 (0.123) (0.122) 
Polity 2 -0.00525 -0.00493 
 (0.016) (0.016) 
Population (ln) 0.76583*** 0.76401*** 
 (0.109) (0.110) 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.36719** -0.37174** 
 (0.150) (0.151) 
International Conflict -0.04259 -0.06467 
 (0.346) (0.348) 
Civil Conflict -0.01935 -0.00301 
 (0.367) (0.370) 
HRO Count 1.17578*** 1.16747*** 
 (0.197) (0.196) 
English Origin -0.47105 -0.42760 
 (0.454) (0.459) 
French Origin -0.18367 -0.15285 
 (0.599) (0.607) 
SocComm Origin -0.00570 0.04559 
 (0.437) (0.443) 
Age of Democracy 0.00079 0.00060 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Civil War Transition 0.47855** 0.48039** 
39 
 
 (0.230) (0.220) 
Collapse -1.73225*** -1.65323*** 
 (0.245) (0.194) 
Overthrow -0.89526* -0.87321* 
 (0.534) (0.519) 
Sudden Transition 1.14731*** 1.26845*** 
 (0.114) (0.113) 
Constant 9.69369*** 9.69693*** 
 (2.315) (2.326) 
   
Observations 1,409 1,409 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Testing Aggregate Measures of Reparative/Restorative Justice 
 
Table 7: The effects of foreign aid on aggregate measures of reparative/restorative justice 





   
Foreign Aid (ln) 0.09309 0.08736 
 (0.067) (0.068) 
Fariss Human Rights -0.39297*** -0.45337*** 
 (0.143) (0.154) 
Polity 2 -0.03072* -0.02755 
 (0.018) (0.020) 
Population (ln) -0.02148 -0.01324 
 (0.104) (0.108) 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.16028 -0.19741* 
 (0.098) (0.111) 
International Conflict 0.45639 0.94271** 
 (0.341) (0.469) 
Civil Conflict -0.10593 -0.57434 
 (0.311) (0.467) 
HRO Count 0.00025 0.11769 
 (0.182) (0.199) 
English Origin 0.45727 0.22879 
 (0.564) (0.605) 
French Origin 0.06457 -0.28210 
 (0.554) (0.610) 
SocComm Origin 0.55446 0.26195 
 (0.509) (0.573) 
German Origin 1.05534 - 
 (0.708)  
Scand Origin 1.63293 - 
40 
 
 (1.201)  
Age of Democracy -0.00784** -0.00859** 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
Civil War -0.06125 0.35463 
 (0.567) (0.928) 
Collapse -1.24607 - 
 (0.995)  
Overthrow 15.43038*** 13.43376*** 
 (1.202) (1.358) 
Sudden -15.42057*** -13.32516*** 
 (0.754) (0.773) 
lnalpha  -14.02298*** 
  (1.931) 
Constant -16.62446**  
 (8.083) 1,528 
   
Observations 1,595  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
